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The Two Postwar  Eras  and the Conditions for Stability 
in Twentleth-Century  Western  Europe 
CHARLES  S. MAIER 
BROADCASTING  over the BBC in November  1945, A. J.  P. Taylor  assured his lis- 
teners, "Nobody  in Europe believes  in the American  way of life-that  is, in pri- 
vate  enterprise; or  rather  those  who  believe  in  it  are a  defeated  party  and  a 
party which  seems to have  no more future than  the Jacobites  in England  after 
1688.  "I Taylor  proved  to be wrong, or at least premature,  about  the end of pri- 
vate enterprise. The  question  here is why,  at least in Western Europe, there was 
less transformation  than he envisaged.  Posed in broader terms, how did Western 
Europe achieve  political  and  social stability  by the mid-twentieth  century  after 
two great, destructive  wars and  the  intervening  upheaval. 
Historians  often  treat stability  as a passive coming  to rest or a societal  inertia 
that  requires no explanation.  In fact, stabilization  is as challenging  a historical 
problem  as revolution.  It can emerge dramatically.  As one historian who has fo- 
cused on the process wrote, "Political stability,  when  it comes,  often  happens  to 
a society quite  quickly, as suddenly  as water becomes  ice."2 Stabilization,  more- 
over,  does  not  preclude  significant  social  and  political  change  but  often  re- 
quires  it.  Certainly  the  two  world  wars broadened  democracy  in  Britain  and 
stimulated  economic  transformation  in  France.  World  War  II finally  removed 
the contradictions  between  modernity  and  reaction  in Germany,  thereby  facili- 
tating  a meritocratic  pluralism.  Yet,  despite  the transformations,  earlier liberal 
and elitist arrangements  that  governed  the distribution  of wealth  and  power ei- 
ther persisted or were resumed  after authoritarian  intervals.  And  at least  until 
This article was originally drafted during tenure of a fellowship from the National Endowment for the Hu- 
manities to pursue research  on the United States and European reconstruction  after World War II. Previous 
versions  benefited from conversation  with Duke University colleagues as well as from discussion  at seminars at 
the University of Wisconsin in Madison, Princeton University, Harvard University,  and the European Studies 
Center at the University of Chicago, and at Werner Conze's seminar for social and economic history at Hei- 
delberg. A semi-final draft was presented as a paper at the Ninety-Third Annual Meeting of the American 
Historical Association, held in San Francisco, December 1978. I am grateful to Leonard Krieger, Richard 
Kuisel, and Carl Schorske  for their comments at that session.  The present version  is especially indebted to the 
suggestions  of Professor  Kuisel, the subsequent critiques by the anonymous referees  for the American  Historical 
Review,  and the comments of Patrick Fridenson  of the University of Paris-X (Nanterre). 
I Taylor, "The European Revolution," Listener  (London), November 22, 1945, p. 576.. 
2J. H. Plumb, The Origins  of Political  Stability:  England,  1675-1725 (Boston, 1967), xvii. 
327 328  AHR Forum 
the  end  of  the  1960s the  societies  of  Western  Europe  seemed  more  cohesive, 
humdrum,  and  routine  than  either  those  who  feared  change  or  those  who 
longed  for it would  have  predicted. 
The  key to this stability  lies in both postwar eras, the period after World  War 
I as well  as that  after World  War II. Although  the years after the first war  did 
not bring enduring  stabilization,  neither did they produce  the radical  economic 
and  social  change  that  Left and  Right  had  expected.  Outside  Russia  the  first 
war opened  the way only to limited  upheaval,  conservative  reconstruction,  or, in 
some cases, counterrevolution.  With  the end of the second war, as Taylor's prog- 
nosis  suggested,  many  observers  again  anticipated  a  major  social  transforma- 
tion. This  time  the postwar years brought  not only an ebbing  of radicalism  but 
at  least a generation  of political  and  economic  stability  as well.  Yet  that  mid- 
century stability  rested upon  the cumulative  achievements  of both postwar eras. 
Together  the postwar intervals  comprised  two chapters  in a single  half-century 
effort  by  reform-minded  and  conservative  elites  to  exploit  postwar  circum- 
stances  for a successful restructuring  of the hierarchies they  dominated. 
GIVEN  THE  OBJECTIVE  OF  HISTORICAL  COMPARISON,  the  two  periods  are  usefully 
envisaged  as complementary  and  parallel  alike. Complementary  (as is stressed 
below)  in that each made  its own distinct  but partial contribution  to the process 
of channeling  change.  Parallel in that key political  and economic  developments 
tended  to recapitulate  themselves.  The  recurring elements  after both wars dem- 
onstrate  that, although  many  problems  were different, the same  underlying  po- 
litical  cleavages,  enduring  class  and  industrial  conflicts,  and  continuing  eco- 
nomic  dilemmas  remained.  As  in  earlier  postwar  transitions,  each  period 
witnessed  a swing  from radical challenge  to political  consolidation.  Such  a tra- 
jectory  had marked Europe  in the aftermath  of the wars of the French  Revolu- 
tion  and  Napoleon,  Russia  following  the  Crimean  War,  Italy,  Prussia,  and 
Austria  after the wars of unification,  the United  States after its Civil  War,  and 
France again  in the wake of  1870, Spain  after  1898, and  Russia after  1905. The 
periods  after the  two world wars likewise reveal certain  parallels. 
Consider,  first, the comparable  political  developments.  Just  as radical  or  re- 
formist  forces of  the  Left  seemed  ready  to  impose  extensive  changes  and  then 
lost their impetus  between  1918 and  1921, so the  Resistance-born  coalitions  of 
Communists,  Socialists,  Catholics,  and  liberal  democrats  initiated  reforms but 
collapsed  by  1947-48.  In  both  cases  this  disarray  followed  early  polarization 
within  the working-class parties and  unions.  From the viewpoint  of the  moder- 
ates, Soviet-oriented  leaders grew ruthlessly opportunistic  and sectarian; reverse 
the  perspective  and  Social  Democrats  appear  preoccupied  with  Bolshevism  or 
communism.  After both wars, too, the respective Catholic  parties-the  German 
Zentrum  and  the  Italian  Popolari  after  1918, the  diverse Christian  Democrats 
after  1945-also  retreated from their earlier commitments  to boldly  proclaimed 
economic  reforms. Catholic  trade-union  leaders and  left intellectuals  lost out  to 
spokesmen  for  middle-class  stability,  the  Church  hierarchy,  or  "social-market 
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A careful distinction  is necessary here. After  1945, plans to supersede  capital- 
ism yielded  to efforts to reinvigorate  economic  liberalism.  Yet  liberal  party  or- 
ganizations  continued  the  long-term  decline  that  had  originated  even  before 
World War I. This attrition hurt both right- and left-wing variants of liberalism, 
although  the Right  could  fall back upon  the economic  interest groups it domi- 
nated and the Left still controlled  influential journalistic  outposts.  Electoral sup- 
port, however, was a different story. Voting  results were prevailingly  disappoint- 
ing.  In  1946 Italian  laissez-faire  Liberals  and  the  reformist Actionists  together 
polled  no more than  8 percent  of the electorate.  The  French non-Marxist,  non- 
Catholic  Left had brilliant writers but few voters. Belgian  Liberal deputies  were 
returned  at  roughly  half  of  their  prewar strength  with  about  9 percent  of  the 
popular  poll,  and  the  revived  Liberal  Democratic  party  in  West  Germany 
(today's Free Democrats),  with  its 9.5 percent  in Landtag  elections  and  12 per- 
cent  of the  first Bundestag,  remained  comparable  to voting  results of the  com- 
bined  Democratic  (Staatspartei)  and  People's  parties  in  the  late  Weimar  Re- 
public.3 
Just  as striking as the draining  of energy on the Left in the respective postwar 
years was the recapitulation  of key industrial  and monetary  developments.  Cer- 
tainly  the  economy  of  the  era  after  1948  became  far  more  robust  than  the 
ephemeral  prosperity of the late  1920s. Nonetheless,  some of the same dilemmas 
and solutions  marked both  recoveries. By the mid- 1920s Americans  were finally 
helping  ease  Europe's  postwar  balance-of-payments  difficulties  by  the  enthu- 
siastic purchase  of European  bonds.  At the same time, leading  bankers on both 
sides  of  the  Atlantic  pressed  for currency  stabilization  and  monetary  convert- 
ibility  on  the  basis  of  the  gold-exchange  standard:  the  Reichsmark  was  an- 
chored in late  1924, sterling in April  1925, the lira in  1927, and the French franc 
(legally re-established  exclusively  on a gold base) in  1928. The  laboriously  nego- 
tiated  tariff compromises  and  trade treaties of the latter  1920s along  with  such 
interindustry  agreements  as the Entente  Internationale  de l'Acier advanced  the 
integration  of the major Continental  steel and chemical  producers. Agreements 
between  industries  across  frontiers  encouraged  mergers  and  concentration 
within  the  component  national  economies.  In  a  similar  sequence  after  World 
War  II, the  European  Recovery  Program  of  1948-51  and  subsequent  Mutual 
Security  assistance provided  American  credits to compensate  for Europe's mas- 
sive dollar deficit.  The  European  Payments  Union,  the product  of negotiations 
extending  from  1948 to  1951, worked  toward  renewed  currency  convertibility. 
The  Coal-Steel  Community  of the early  1950s reinforced the capitalist  revival of 
the second  postwar  period.4 
3 For a useful tabulation of voting results,  see Derek W. Urwin, ed., Elections  in Western  Nations,  1945-1968, 
University of Strathclyde, Survey Research Center, Occasional  Papers,  nos. 4-5  (Glasgow, n.d.). 
4 For the negotiations of the  1920s, see Charles S. Maier, Recasting  Bourgeois  Europe:  Stabilization  in France, 
Germany,  and  Italy in the Decade  after World  War  I (Princeton, 1975), 516-45; and Jacques Bari6ty, "Das Zu- 
standekommen  der Internationalen  Rohstahlgemeinschaft  (1926) als Alternative  zum misslungenen  'Schwerin- 
dustriellen  Projekt'  des Versailler  Vertrages,"  in Hans Mommsen et al., eds., Industrielles  System  undpolitische  Ent- 
wicklung  in der Weimarer  Republik  (Disseldorf,  1974), 552-68.  For the negotiations between coal and  steel 
producers  after World War II, the material in the steel trusteeship  papers at the Koblenz Bundesarchiv  [here- 
after, BA], B 109/97, is revealing;  these papers are complemented by the memoranda of meetings included in 330  AHR Forum 
Obviously,  there were crucial differences between  the two postwar eras; to dis- 
cern  parallels  is not  to claim  identities.  After  the  First World  War,  to cite just 
a first salient  difference,  the political  Right  emerged  more  militant  than  before 
1914. Fascism drew upon  a striking force of veterans inured to violence  and  con- 
temptuous  of  civilian  virtues.  After  the  Second  World  War,  fascism  was  dis- 
credited  and even  traditional  conservative  nationalism  rejected. The  psychologi- 
cal impact  of the fighting  did not create nuclei  of Arditi,  Free Corps recruits, or 
others  addicted  to paramilitary  violence.  For most  soldiers the  second  war  im- 
pelled  instead  a search  for private  fulfillment:  "the happy  obscurity  of a  hum- 
drum job  and  a little wife and  a household  of kids," according  to Bill Mauldin, 
or, a front away, the return to "the mountains  of the Caucasus,  the exciting  blue 
smoke  of  the  foothills  . . .,  the  sweet  faces of  loved  ones."5 What  analogue  ex- 
isted after  1945 to the  trincetsmo,  the  glorification  of the  trenches  of World  War 
I, was the partisans' mountain  ordeal: a trial that Resistance  spokesmen  claimed 
was moral justification  for a new elite,  although  without  any encouragement  for 
a continuing  cult  of violence.  Indeed,  the  distinction  in  1914-18  between  front 
soldiers  mired  down  in  brutalizing  combat  and  male  civilians  at  home  who 
sometimes  enjoyed  cushy,  protective  berths-the  so-called  embusques  or  imbos- 
cati-dissolved  in  1939-45  with the rapid movement  of troops, the air attacks on 
civilian  targets, and the hardships of occupation.  Almost  50 percent  of Europe's 
dead  in the second  war were civilians,  compared  to about  5 percent  in the  first."' 
These  factors  all  contributed  to  limiting  the  potential  of  any  veterans-based 
right  radicalism.  Except  for the  recurring  but  small  German  nationalist  splin- 
ters, achieving  at  best  8 to  10 percent  electoral  support  at the  Land  level  (and 
about  2 percent  in  national  polls),  the  search  for right-wing  movements  after 
1945 yields  only  ambivalent  possibilities:  the  Gaullism  of  1947 and  the  Uomo 
Qualunque  of southern  Italy,  a sort of pre-Poujadism  that  rejected  the  moral- 
istic claims  of the Resistance  Left. This  failure of the neofascist  Right  to emerge 
in greater strength  was a major surprise of postwar  European  politics.7 
the  archives  of  the  Compagnie  de  Pont-A-Mousson  at  La  Chatre  [hereafter,  PAM],  boxes  70669,  70671, 
706,90-91,  77042.  Also  see  William  Diebold,  Jr.,  rThe  Schuman Plan: A Study in Economic Cooperation,  1950-1959 
(New  York,  1959).  For monetary  negotiations,  see  Stephen  V.  0.  Clarke,  Central Bank Cooperation,  1924-1931 
(New York, 1967);  Sir fIenry Clay, Lord  Norman  (London, 1957);  L. V. Chandler, Benjamin  Strong,  Central  Banker 
(Washington,  1958); W.  A.  Brown,  Jr.,  England and the New  Gold Standard, 1919-1926  (New  Haven,  1929),  and 
The International Gold  Standard  Reinterpreted,  1914-1934,  2 vols.  (New  York,  1940); Donald  E.  Moggridge,  British 
Monetary Policy, 1924-1931:  The Norman Conquest  of $4.86  (Cambridge,  1972);  and  Gerd  Hardach,  Weltmarkt- 
orientierung  und relative  Stagnation Wdhrungspolitik  tn Deutschland, 1924-1931,  Schriften  zur  Wirtschafts-  und  Sozial- 
geschichte, vol. 27 (Berlin, 1976). For post-1945 negotiations, see William Diebold, Jr., Trade  and Payments  in 
Western  Euirope  (New  York,  1952); J.  Kummell,  De  Ontwikkeling van het Internationale  Betalingsverkeer  (Leiden, 
1950);  Robert Triffin, Europe  and  the  Money  Muddle  (New Haven, 1957);  and Raymond F. Mikesell, Foreign  Ex- 
change in the Postwar World (New  York,  1954). 
5  As quoted  in John  Morton  Blum,  V Was  for  Victory:  Politics and American  Culture  during World War II  (New 
York,  1976),  70,  73. For the  attituides  and  political  organization  of veterans,  only  a minority  of whom  became 
radically  antidemocratic,  see James  M.  Diehl,  Paramilitary  Politiscs  in Weimar  Germany  (Bloomington,  Ind.,  1977); 
Volker  R.  Berghahn,  Der Stahlhelm, Bund der Frontsoldaten,  1918-1935  (Dusseldorf,  1966);  Robert  G.  L.  Waite, 
Vanguard  of Nazism:  The Free Corps Movement  in Postwar Germany,  1918-1923  (Cambridge,  Mass.,  1952);  Giorgio 
Sabatucci,  I combattenti  nel primodopoguerra  (Bari,  1974); and  Antoine  Prost,  Les Anciens combattants  et la societeftan- 
faise,  1914-1939,  3 vols.  (Paris,  1977),  esp.  volume  3: Ideologies et mentalitis. 
' Gordon  Wright,  The Ordeal of Total  War, 1939-1945  (New  York,  1968),  264. 
7 For the Gaullism of 1947, see Jean Touchard, Le Gaullisme,  1940-1969 (Paris, 1978), 98-133. On  Uomo 
Qualunque, see Sandro Setta, L'Uomo  Qulunque,  1944/48  (Bari, 1975). And,  for post-1945 Germany, see 
Kurt  P. Tauber,  Beyond  Eagle and Swastika: German  Nationalism since 1945,  2  vols.  (Middletown,  Conn.,  1967). The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions  for Stability  331 
Only  in  retrospect  is it  discernible  that  even  under  the  collaborationist  re- 
gimes  conservative  elements  had  to rethink  the  economic  role of the  state  and 
the  future  relationship  of  capital  and  labor.  To  cite just  the  French  situation 
(although  analogues  existed  in the Netherlands  and  the Salo Republic),  aware- 
ness that the Vichy  regime was doomed  and mass upheaval  likely prompted  the 
industrialists summoned  by the Conseil  Superieur de l'1tconomie Industrielle  et 
Commerciale  to search  for a "factory community"  that  would  provide  a  "bal- 
anced  solution"  between  "yesterday's capitalism"  and  "collectivism."  Such  ex- 
plorations,  however,  could  build  upon  more  than  fear of  postwar  revolution. 
They  carried forward some of the heterodox  notions  of economic  planning  that 
dissenting  socialists  and  conservative  intellectuals  alike  had  outlined  in  the 
1930s.8 
A major condition  for a more flexible Right  was the fact that the Left too  de- 
barked differently  after the second  war. Between  1918 and  1921 the  European 
working  classes  had  first  surged  into  spontaneous  demonstrations,  had  then 
waged  long,  disciplined  mass strikes, and  had  finally  retrenched  in  frustration 
and  divided.  Much  of their insurrection  followed  from the intensified  labor dis- 
cipline  the war imposed  as well as progressive ideological  alienation  from its na- 
tional  objectives.  The  second  war imposed  some of the same  ordeals within  the 
factory, but the German occupation  made  the factory a less central source of op- 
pression. The  heirs of the working-class leadership  that had come  to oppose  the 
first war by  1917 urged active resistance to the Germans after June  1941, so that 
the second war was less an alien upper-class cause than an arduous wait  for lib- 
eration.  Its conclusion  thus brought  a different tempo  of working-class  coopera- 
tion  and  protest.  Western  Communists  played  down  any  radical  economic 
transformation  that  outran  the  broad  Resistance  consensus  on  purges  and  the 
nationalization  of key industries or those tainted  by their owners' collaboration. 
Instead  Communist  leaders  stressed  anti-Nazi  unity  (until  the  final  defeat  of 
Germany)  and  continuing  production,  even  at the  cost of harsh industrial  dis- 
cipline.  "The  bonus  per  ton  is  evil,"  wrote  one  CGT  leader  in  March  1945 
about  detested  pay  differentials,  "but  coal  is  necessary."  Maurice  Thorez  in- 
sisted to coal miners at Waziers in July  1945 that production  itself was a demon- 
stration  of solidarity,  militancy,  and  working-class  power.9 "Only  by  working, 
only  by working hard will we be able to overcome  this situation  [of hardship]," 
the secretary of the  Milan  Chamber  of Labor  told  the factory council  of Mag- 
neti Mirelli in early  1946. "We all seek socialism. But do you believe that we can 
8 Conseil Superieur  de l'tconomie Industrielle  et Commerciale,  Commission Nr. 4, Proces-Verbal  de la se- 
ance du 5 novembre 1943, PAM, box 70411;  and Report to the Minister,  July 17, 1944, ibid.  Also see Richard 
Kuisel, "Vichy et les origines de la planification  economique (1940-1946)," Le Mouvement  Social,  98 (1977): 77- 
101;  Jacques Amoyal, "Les Origines socialistes  et syndicalistes  de la planification en France,"  ibid.,  87 (1974): 
137-69; and, on the labor issue,  Jacques Julliard, "La Charte du Travail," in Jeanine Bourdin, ed., Le Gou- 
vernement  de Vichy,  1940-1942: Colloque  de la Fondation  Nationale  des  Sciences  Politiques  (Paris, 1972), 157-210. 
9 L. Delfosse, in La Tribune  des Mineurs,  March 18, 1945, as quoted in Jean Bouvier, "Region et Nation: 
Inflation, reformes  de structures,  nationalisation des houilleres,  et crise sociale," Actes  du Colloque  de l'Universite 
de Lille  III, 2-3 novembre  1974:  La Liberation  du  Nord  et du Pas-de-Calais,  1944-1947 [hereafter,  Colloque  de Lille], in 
Revue  du Nord,  57 (1975): 609. For Communist policies, see J.-P. Hirsch, "'La Seule voie possible':  Remarques 
sur les communistes du Nord et.du Pas-de-Calais  de la Liberation aux greves de novembre 1947,"  ibid., 563- 
78, which contains an extensive discussion  of Thorez's celebrated Waziers appeal, July 21, 1945. 332  AHR Forum 
socialize  poverty?" Communists,  warned Jacques  Duclos,  as he condemned  the 
1946  Socialist-supported  strikes of  French  civil  servants,  had  to  demonstrate 
"that democracy  is a regime  of order, a regime  of tranquility  and  of work."'" 
The  open  question  in France, Belgium,  and  Italy  (to the extent  that  the  An- 
glo-American  occupation  would  have  permitted)  was  whether  an  angry  and 
long-repressed  working  class would  explode  in  a spontaneous  radicalism  with 
plant  seizures,  local  "socialization,"  and  summary  trials. Communist  pressure 
for  carrying  through  purge  procedures  probably  helped  contain  grass-roots 
grievances. In fact, whether  in France, Italy,  Belgium,  Holland,  or Bavaria  (un- 
der  American  auspices),  the  purges  became  more  and  more  restricted.  Cate- 
gories  of  guilt  seemed  to  blur  hopelessly,  and  moderates  came  to  grasp  that 
trying  business  leaders  for cooperation  with  the  Germans  could  have  radical 
consequences,  or, in the words of one Esprit intellectual  who  advocated  it, "The 
purge of the economic  sector entails overturning  all property relations.""  Purges 
were  thus  wound  down  short of any  major  upheaval,  and  the  emphasis  upon 
sifting  individuals  probably  diverted  effort from institutional  transformation- 
although  originally  the  Left  had  envisaged  kpuration  as  a  mode  of  collective 
change. 
Perhaps,  however,  the major force for preventing  ideological  polarization  af- 
ter World  War  II was  neither  the  chastened  Right  nor the  tempered  Left  but 
the  new  Christian  Democratic  parties of the  center.  For the crucial  three years 
after  1944,  left  Catholicism  with  its  declared  hostility  to  liberal  capitalism 
seemed  ascendant.  The  appearance  was deceptive  in the long run, but it served 
well  to contain  otherwise  radical currents in the flux of the immediate  postwar 
period.  Konrad  Adenauer  could  swallow  and  survive the  radical-sounding  Ah- 
len  Program  of  the  Westphalian  Christian  Democrats  in  1947, understanding 
that it kept the CDU  from appearing  reactionary; Alcide  De Gasperi ultimately 
profited  from the mass base organized  by Catholic  labor leader Achille  Grandi; 
and the French MRP  accepted  nationalization  but, except  for collaborators,  in- 
sisted  upon  compensation.'2  In  Italy  and  Belgium  the  prolonged  controversy 
0 Milanese secretary  of the Chamber of Labor, as quoted in Febo Guizzi, "La Fabbrica italiana Magneti 
Marelli," in Luigi Ganapini et al., La ricostruzione  nella  grande  industria:  Strategia  padronale  e organismi  difabbrica  nel 
Triangolo,  1945-1948 (Bari, 1978), 280; and Duclos, as quoted in Alain Bergonieux,  Force  Ouvriere  (Paris, 1975), 
55. 
1' G. Zerapha, "Le Probleme politique francais,"  Esprit,  December 1944, as quoted in Michel Winock, His- 
toire  politique  de la revue  "Esprit"  (Paris, 1975), 260. On the purges, see Peter Novick, The  Resistance  versus  Vichy 
(New  York, 1968); Robert Aron, Histoire  de l'epuration,  3  vols.  (Paris, 1967-75); D.  Laurent et al.,  "Sur 
'Iepuration  dans le Nord et le Pas-de-Calais,"  Colloque  de  Lille,  in Revue  du  Nord,  57 (1975):  365-80, 623-36; Lutz 
Niethammer,  Entnazifizierung  in Bayern:  &uiberung  und  Rehabilitierung  unter  amerikanischer  Besatzung  (Frankfurt  a/M, 
1972);  and Marcello Flores, "L'Epurazione,"  in Instituto Nazionale per la Storica del Movimento di Liber- 
azione in Italia, L'Italia  dalla liberazione  alla repubblica;  del convegno  internazionale...  26-28  marzo  1976 (Milan, 
n.d.), 413-67. Also see Guizzi, "La Fabbrica italiana Magneti Marelli," 245-72; and Valerio Castronovo, Gio- 
vanni  Agnelli  (Turin, 1971),  671-88. Also see the reports  from U.S. diplomats on the slowing of the Belgian and 
Dutch purges,  National Archives,  Washington, Record Group 59 [hereafter,  NA-RG 59], including the report 
by Charles Sawyer, May  29,  1945, NA-RG 59,855.00/5-2945; by Theodore Achilles, June  11, 1946, ibid., 
855.00/6-1146; and by J. Webb Benton from the Hague, August 15, 1946, ibid.,  856.00/8-1546. 
12 For Adenauer's  views, see Sozialausschuss  der CDU, February  21-22,  1947, in Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 
Bonn, Hensler Nachlass, 16. Also see Gerold Ambrosius, Die Durchsetzung  der  sozialen  Marktwirtschafi  in West- 
deutschland,  1945-1949 (Stuttgart, 1977);  and Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung,  Konrad  Adenauer  und  die CDU der  brit- 
ischen  Besatzungszone,  1946-1949 (Bonn, 1975),  46-47, 288-89. On Grandi, see Benedetto de Cesaris,  "Cattolici, The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions  for Stability  333 
over the fate of the discredited  monarchs  helped  the Catholic  parties accommo- 
date both  Left and Right.  As the American  embassy reported from Brussels, the 
Christian  Social  party, by defending  the rights of Leopold  III, could  retain  the 
allegiance  of Belgian  conservatives,  even  while  letting  its trade unionists  cham- 
pion social reform, and could  thus provid'e "all things to all men who believe  in 
the Roman  Catholic  religion."  13 This capacity  naturally undermined  the radical 
elan  of  Christian  democracy  but  did  allow  the  movement  to  serve  as  an  in- 
tegrating  force for moderation. 
Domestic  party  developments  obviously  took place  under  the shadow  of the 
great  powers.  The  overwhelming  difference  between  1918  and  1945  was  the 
continuing  intervention  of the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  in their re- 
spective  spheres of influence.  But in Western Europe, American  aid, with  its at- 
tendant  pressure, was only  one  of many  factors abetting  liberal  reconstitution. 
The  discrediting  of the European  Right,  the fear of Communist  motives and  the 
Soviet  Union  that  replaced  Popular  Front effusions, and  the desire on the  part 
of both  Christian  Democrats  and  Social  Democrats  to establish  moderate  wel- 
fare states were  powerful  impulses  on  their own.  They  alone  sufficed  to  make 
1945 different from  1918. 
DIFFERENT,  BUT NOT SEPARATE. Both postwar periods, as noted,  formed part of a 
continuing  effort at stabilization,  a search that  was sufficiently  active  and  per- 
sistent  (and rewarded finally with  sufficient success) to comprise a major theme 
of  twentieth-century  Western  European  history.  Stabilization,  however,  for 
whom?  And of what? Stabilization  meant  not so much  preserving liberal proce- 
dures as re-establishing  the overlapping  hierarchies of power, wealth,  and status 
that  can  be  loosely  termed  "capitalist." In an age  of mass suffrage, these  chal- 
lenged  hierarchies had to be defended  less in terms of custom  than results-that 
is, their performance  for society  as a whole.  Increasingly,  performance  included 
the maintenance  of economic  welfare. The  Depression  led voters to shatter  the 
Western  political  coalitions  of  the  1920s even  when  it  did  not  destroy  demo- 
cratic  regimes.  Distress forced  governments  in  the  1930s to  become  employers 
of  last  resort; by  the  1950s they  were  called  upon  to  assure  continuing  eco- 
nomic  growth  as well  as high  employment  at a given  level of national  income. 
Stabilization  thus entailed  a dual task. It meant  re-establishing  the contested  le- 
gitimacy  of  European  social  and  economic  elites-buttressing  the  hierarchies 
that  even  in an age of mass voting  still presupposed  that  only  small  minorities 
could  share the  prerogative  of directing  human  labor. Justifying  inequality,  in 
turn, required satisfying criteria of economic  performance: figuratively  and liter- 
ally delivering  the goods. Although  they  had  to broaden  their recruitment  and 
recognize  new  spokesmen  for organized  labor,  by  and  large  the  elites  superin- 
ereditA  'popolari,'  e nuovo stato," in Problemi  del movimento  sindacale  in Italia, 1943-1973: Annali  della  Fondazione 
Giangiacomo  Feltrinelli,  16 (1976): 229-39. For the MRP stance, see the discussions  of Bidault and Menthon 
with Communist and Socialist leaders,  January 23, 1945, Colloque  de  Lille,  in Revue  du  Nord,  57 (1975):  596-97. 
'3Jefferson Patterson to the Department of State, August 20, 1945, NA-RG 59, 855.00/8-2045. 334  AHR Forum 
tending  Western society met these related conditions  for stability-those  of legi- 
timation  and  those  of  production.  But  they  did  not  meet  both  conditions  at 
once. 
Instead,  Europe's elites  resolved  their difficulties  seriatim,  such  that  each  ef- 
fort of postwar stabilization  overcame  one of the two challenges.  With  the  1920s 
came  not  a total,  but  a nevertheless  impressive,  response to  the  ideological  at- 
tack  upon  the  legitimacy  of  capitalist  hierarchies  as  hierarchies.  That  is,  the 
leaders of the  1920s rallied  with  persuasive justifications  of capitalist  entrepre- 
neurship.  They  ended  up  rejustifying  not  so much  ownership  per se as a  hier- 
archy of managerial  power that preserved the essentials of control.  Nonetheless, 
the  1920s did  not solve  the economic  dilemma  of ensuring  continuous  produc- 
tion  and  high  employment.  That  task was  left  to  the  second  postwar  period. 
Only  by the  1950s were the afflictions that undermined  capitalist  stability  effec- 
tively  overcome  as a whole.  The  cumulative  achievement  required  the  institu- 
tional  flux that  was left in the wake  of not one  but  two wartime  upheavals. 
In what  sense can it be maintained,  however, that developments  of the  1920s 
served  durably  to  reinforce the  legitimacy  of  European  capitalism?  In  light  of 
mass unemployment,  the taint of wartime  collaboration,  and the wave of social- 
ist aspirations incorporated  in the Resistance,  did not capitalism  seem as shaken, 
vulnerable,  and  problematic  after World War II as ever before-hence  A. J.  P. 
Taylor's  verdict? In fact, however,  the  Left's programs after World  War  II did 
not often  go so far as the challenges  of  1918-2 1.14  This  does not  mean  that  the 
Left was universally stronger earlier. Although  in Germany  and Italy social  rev- 
olutionary  outcomes  had  been  more  feasible  after  the  First than  the  Second 
World War  (if only because  no occupying  forces were present), had  it chosen  to 
exploit  its power, the French Left possessed a more commanding  position in late 
1944  than  it  had  controlled  in  1918.  In  Britain  the  protests  of  1918-19  that 
looked toward a syndicalist  socialism  were succeeded  in  1945 by the more solid, 
if more moderate,  triumph  of the Labour party. In short, the relative strength of 
the  Left in the respective  postwar  periods depended  to a great extent  upon  the 
particular  national  situation.  The  programs  of  the  Left,  however,  often  re- 
mained  a less clearcut  challenge  after  1944 than  they were after  1918. They  as- 
pired  less to overturn  bureaucratic  and  economic  control  than  to attain  public 
ownership of key industries. By  1945, however, ownership was a less crucial issue 
than earlier for many  sectors that the Left targeted  for nationalization.  The  ear- 
lier socialist  challenge  that  followed  in  the  wake  of  the  Bolshevik  Revolution 
with  its innovation  of soviets was probably  more fundamental.  What  the partic- 
ipants in the massive strikes and insurrections of  1918-21,  the militants  at party 
and  union  congresses, and  the  remarkable  socialist  theorists of the  early  1920s 
urged in aggregate  was not  merely the centralization  of important  industries  in 
14 On this point, see some of the recent surveys  of this period, including Francis  Carsten, Revolution  in Central 
Europe, 1918-1919  (London,  1972); Charles  L.  Bertrand,  ed.,  Revolutionary  Situations in Europe, 1917-1922:  Ger- 
many,  Italy,  Austria-Hungary,  Proceedings  of the Second International  Colloquium of the Interuniversity  Center 
for  European  Studies  (Montreal,  1977);  and  Rivoluzione  e reazione in Europa, 1917/1924:  Convegno  storico inter- 
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the hands of the state; this demand  came  from moderate  Social  Democrats.  In- 
stead, they criticized managerial  control of the workplace  and of production  re- 
gardless of  ownership;  and,  by  extension,  they  challenged  the  chains  of  com- 
mand  of the Western  economies  from top  to bottom. 
These  movements  failed  in the West  for many  reasons. They  were rooted  in 
the  shop  steward  organizations  of  the  Clydeside,  the  factory  grievance  com- 
mittees  established  during  the  war  to  smooth  labor  relations,  which  in  turn 
helped  generate  the  consigli di fabbrica of  Turin  and  the  Rate in  Germany  and 
Austria. Some spokesmen  for these councils envisioned  a syndical  reorganization 
of  the  economy  and  politics.  But  often  their  militancy  derived  from the  more 
conservative  impulses  of defending  the  work skills and  artisanal  independence 
still  conserved  under  factory  roofs against  degrading  standardization  of  tasks 
and  wartime  "dilution"  (the  hiring  of  unskilled  replacements,  sometimes 
women).'5  Moreover,  the  councils  comprised  a strong movement  only  in a  few 
industrial  regions, and  their revolts exploded  out of phase with  each other. The 
movement,  moreover,  appears  to  have  evoked  the  least  resonance  in  France, 
which  would  still  have  had  to  be  the  keystone  of  any  general  West  European 
transformation.  In  France,  reformist socialists  as well  as  industrial  leaders  re- 
stricted  the  mandate  of  factory  delegates,  while  after  the  armistice  radicals 
spilled  into street demonstrations  that were militant  but  diffuse and  finally  set- 
tled on a program for nationalization  of the railroads."6  Likewise in Britain,  La- 
bour  militants  came  to focus upon  takeover of the  coal  industry.  In Germany, 
the councils emerged  during revolution  but often just to take charge of factories, 
regiments,  or towns in which  central authority  crumbled.  When  German  coun- 
cil champions  took up explicitly  socialist goals, they incurred drastic repression, 
as in Munich  in April  1919 or in the  Ruhr  after the Kapp  Putsch.'7 
Trade-union  leaders,  moreover,  remained  cool  toward  alternative  modes  of 
representation,  fearing that the new councils would  undercut  their long, patient 
15 On the resistance  of skilled workers,  see James Hilton, The  First  Shop  Stewards'  Movement  (London, 1973); 
Bertrand  Abherve "Les Origines de la greve des metallurgistes  parisiens,  juin  1919," Le Mouvement  Social,  93 
(1975): 75-85; and David Montgomery, "The 'New Unionism' and the Transformation  of Workers' Con- 
sciousness in America, 1909--1922,"  Journal  of Social  History,  7 (1974): 50929.  Also see Carmen J. Sirianni, 
"Workers'  Control in the Era of World War I: A Comparative Analysis of the European Experience," Theory 
and  Society,  9 (1980):  29-88; and Martin Clark,  Antonio  Gramnci  and  the  Revolution  that  Failed  (New Haven, 1977). 
16 Abherve, "Les Origines de la greve des metallurgistes  parisiens";  Nicholas Papyanis, "Masses  revolution- 
naires et directions reformistes:  Les Tensions au coeur des greves des metallurgistes  fran,ais en  1919," Le 
Mouvement  Social,  93 (1975):  51-73; and Gilbert Hatry, "Les Delegues d'atelier  aux Usines Renault," in Patrick 
Fridenson,  ed., 1914-1918, I'autrefront:  Cahiers  du "Mouvement  Social",  2 (Paris, 1977):  221-35. Also see the older 
surveys,  Roger Picard, Le Mouvement  syndical  durant  la guerre  (Paris, 1927);  and William Oualid and Charles Pic- 
quenard, Salaires  et tariffes,  conventions  collectives,  et greves:  La Politique  du Ministere  de l'Arnament  (Paris, 1928)8 
17 On Britain,  in addition to Hinton's The  First  Shop  Stewards'  Movement,  see Branko  Pribicevic, The  Shop  Stew- 
ards'  Movement  and Workers'  Control  (Oxford, 1959);  Arthur Marwick, The  Deluge  (New York, 1970), 56-76, 203- 
09; and G. D. H. Cole, Labour  in the  Coal-Mining  Industry,  1914-21 (Oxford, 1923). On Germany, see Eberhard 
Kolb, Die Arbeiterrate  in der deutschen  Innenpolitik,  1918-1919  (Diusseldorf,  1962), and "Riitewirklichkeit  und 
Rate-ideologie  in der deutschen Revolution von 1918-1919," in Kolb, ed., Vom  Kaiserreich  zur Wezmarer  Republik 
(Cologne, 1972), 165-84; Reinhard Rurup, ed., Arbeiter-  und  Soldatenrate  im rheinisch-westfdlischen  Industriegebiet 
(Wuppertal, 1975); Peter von Oertzen, Betriebsrate  in der  Novemberrevolution  (Dusseldorf, 1963); Erhard Lucas, 
Mdrzrevolution  um  Ruhrgebiet,  vol. 1 (Frankfurt  a/M,  1970),  and Mdrzrevolution  1920, vol. 2 (Frankfurt  a/M,  1973); 
and Georg Eliasberg,  Der  Ruhrkrieg  1920 (Bonn, 1974). 336  AHR Forum 
struggle to speak for labor. Bourgeois politicians  such as David  Lloyd George  in 
1919  or  Giovanni  Giolitti  in  1920  deflected  protests  into  cumbersome  com- 
mittees,  which  finally  generated  compromise  proposals  for  co-determination 
that  commanded  no  adherence  and  were  soon  shelved  (much  like  the  recent 
Bullock  Commission  in  Britain).  Supple  industrial  leaders,  such  as  Milanese 
banker and electrical magnate  Ettore Conti or Rhenish  lignite industrialist  Paul 
Silverberg,  similarly  exploited  such spurious concessions.18 
Still,  given  the  limitations  of  the  movement,  the  council  episodes  suggested 
that  bourgeois  concepts  of  rational  economic  and  political  authority  were  all 
terribly vulnerable.  The  dramas staged at Fiat or Renault  or the mines of Essen 
were  frightening  not  primarily  because  they  may  have  attained  an  ephemeral 
success but  because  they  suggested  that  only  force, not  consensus,  stood  in the 
way of a collectivist  alternative.  At stake, therefore, was bourgeois  legitimacy  as 
well  as naked control.  Bourgeois  response, thus, had  to go beyond  mere repres- 
sion. Counterstrategies  had to operate on plant  and national  planes, micro- and 
macro-levels  simultaneously.  The  need  to  reassert authority  within  the  factory 
gave renewed  impetus  to plans for scientific  management,  which  would  further 
centralize  factory authority  by differentiating  tasks "down to the tiniest detail," 
as some  French sponsors defined  their Taylorite  efforts.19 
Acceptance  of  this technocratic  functionalism  required  conservative  flexibil- 
ity,  and  business  as well  as political  milieux  divided  between  progressives  and 
reactionaries.  The  reactionaries  distrusted  industry-wide  organization  and  in- 
sisted on the prerogatives of ownership,  asserting what  the Germans called  their 
Herr-im-Hause  domination.  But  the  more  fruitful  approach  was  to  build  upon 
the  potential  for cooptation  that  wartime  labor-management  agreements  and 
the  unavowed  brotherhood  of wage-price  spirals had  encouraged  after  1914.20 
As  might  be  expected,  the  industrial  "progressives" were  less fixated  on  own- 
ership,  more  concerned  with  managerial  expertise;  they  were  multi-divisional 
foxes rather than single-factory  lions. Building  upon  his wartime  organizational 
efforts, Walther  Rathenau  forcefully defended  entrepreneurial  leadership,  while 
outlining  complex  schemes for capitalist  self-government  and planning.  Later in 
the decade,  Alfred Mond,  organizer of the Imperial  Chemical  cartel and Ernest 
Mercier,  an  architect  of French  electrical  networks, pursued  related  visions  (as 
did  Herbert  Hoover  in  the  United  States).2" Other  spokesmen  throughout  the 
18 See Charles S. Maier, Recasting  Bourgeois  Europe  (Princeton, 1975), chap. 3. 
9 "Concours  pour l'application  du Systeme Taylor dans les Mines et Usines de la Societe de Pont-'-Mous- 
son: Preamble,"  PAM, box 18936. 
20 Gerald Feldman, "German Business between War and Revolution: The Origins of the Stinnes-Legien 
Agreement,"  in Gerhard  A. Ritter, ed., Entstehung  und Wandel  der  modernen  Gesellschaft:  Festschrift  fir Hans Rosen- 
berg  zum 65. Geburtstag  (Berlin, 1978), 312-41, and Iron  and  Steel  in the German  Inflation,  1916-1923 (Princeton, 
1977),  91; Charles  A. Gulick,  Austriafrom  Habsburg  to  Hitler,  2 vols. (Berkeley  and Los Angeles, 1948), 1; 150-57; 
and Charles S. Maier, "The Politics of Inflation in the Twentieth Century,"  in Fred Hirsch and John Gold- 
thorpe, eds., The  Political  Economy  of Inflation  (Cambridge,  Mass., 1978), 49-52. 
21 Walther Rathenau, Von  kommenden  Dingen  (1916), and Die neue  Wirtschaft  (1917), volumes 2 and 3 of his 
Gesammelte  Schrnfjen  (Berlin, 1918);  Alfred Moritz Mond, Industry  and  Politics  (London, 1927); Hector Bolitho, 
Alfred  Mond,  First  Lord  Melchett  (London, 1933), 313-18; and Richard Kuisel, Ernest  Mercier,  French  Technocrat 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967). Also see Martin Fine, "L'Association  Francaise pour le Progres Social 
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1920s derived  from the  important  interindustry  associations-less  businessmen 
than  their organizers  and  lobbyists:  FranSois Poncet  of the  Comite  des  Forges 
with  his sleek defense of technocratic  inequality;  Gino Olivetti  of Confindustria, 
who  from even before the war was to emphasize  that only the industrialist  could 
"technically  order the factory according  to a pre-established  plan"; his successor 
Antonio  Benni,  who insisted that industry was "not personified by the capitalist 
or the stockholder but by its directors, by its chiefs, and by the organizers of the 
enterprise."22  Industry,  moreover,  became  the  paradigm  for political  society  in 
general, as, for instance,  when  Ernest Mercier sought  to rally managerial  exper- 
tise  in  the  above-party  Redressment  FranSais or  Alfred  Mond  organized  the 
Mond-Turner  talks with  trade-union  leaders in the wake of the British General 
Strike. 
These  initiatives  and self-justifying notions were hardly widespread  enough  to 
reorder industrial organization,  any more than the council  movement  had revo- 
lutionized  the workplace.  Nonetheless,  celebrators and  critics alike felt that  sci- 
entific management  represented a decisive economic  and social breakthrough,23 
and the economic  circumstances of the late  1920s powerfully  reinforced this new 
legitimation  of capitalism.  The  stabilization  of currencies on the gold-exchange 
standard,  renewal of intense international  competition,  and concern about  satu- 
ration of home  markets all made  "rationalization"  more urgent.  Rationalization 
was  a concept  that  comprised  market-sharing  agreements  across frontiers and 
within  domestic  economies  plus  parallel  efforts to  lower  the  burden  of  wages 
and  other  costs through  investment,  technical  improvements,  and  mergers.  At 
the same time  industrial  leaders sought  legitimation  for their power, whether  it 
derived  from the  right to lay off workers in a cyclical  downturn  or from  their 
collaboration  with  an  authoritarian  regime  as  in  Italy.  The  managerial  mys- 
tique  evoked  widespread  enthusiasm,  assumed  a  truly  cultic  importance  pre- 
cisely  because  it was  a modern  and  supposedly  class-neutral  alternative  to  the 
immediately  preceding  socialist  attack on industrial  hierarchies. 
"This Taylorization  is connected  with  the problem  of lowering overall costs," 
noted  Marcel  Paul,  a Pont-a-Mousson  manager,  when  his firm embarked  upon 
the  venture  in  the  late  1920s.24 Scientific  management  supposedly  promised  a 
painless method  of cost cutting,  although  it often just  meant  speed-ups  or extra 
22 Andre Fransois Poncet, Reflexions  d'un  ripublicain  moderne  (Paris, 1925);  Olivetti, as quoted in Franklin  Ad- 
ler, "Factory  Councils, Gramsci, and the Industrialists,"  Telos,  31 (1977): 79; and Benni, as quoted in Maier, 
Recasting  Bourgeois  Europe,  567. Also see Franklin  Adler, "Italian Industrialists  and Radical Fascism," Telos,  30 
(1976-77): 193-201. 
23 For Andre Philips's  analysis of the central role of scientific management in American economic achieve- 
ment, see his Le Problbme  ouvrier  aux Etats-Unis  (Paris, 1927). For the enthusiasm evoked by what I call the 
"tmanagerial  mystique,"  see Edmond Giscard d'Estaing, "Le N6ocapitalisme,"  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  August 
1, 1928;  Paul Devinat, Scientific  Management  in Europe,  ILO Studies and Reports, ser. B, no. 17 (Geneva, 1927); 
and La Prospiritk:  Revue  trimestrielle  de l'organisation  scientifique  (1928-), an ebullient magazine that was briefly 
published by Michelin. 
24 Marcel Paul to Jean Cavalier, May 19, 1928, PAM, box 41595. On the thrust  of rationalization,  see Rob- 
ert Brady, The Rationalization  Movement  in German  Industry  (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1933); Giulio Sapelli, 
"L'Organizzazione  'scientifica'  del lavoro e innovazione tecnologica durante il fascismo,"  Italia Contemporanea, 
28 (1976): 3-28; and Paola Fiorentini, "Ristrutturazione  capitalistica e sfruttamento operaio in Italia negli 
anni '20," Rivista  Storica  del Socialismo,  10 (1967): 134-54. 338  AHR Forum 
hours. The  unions,  however,  had already exhausted  their capacity  for resistance 
during  fruitless  labor  struggles,  in  France  during  1920,  in  Italy  from  1920 
through  1922 and  less overtly  in  1924-26,  in Germany  after the  inflation  and 
again  by  1928, and  in Britain  during  1921 and  1926. By the  late  1920s, more- 
over, a generation  of moderate  labor spokesmen emerged who honestly  believed 
in collaboration:  trade unionists  in Germany  and  the  United  States,  the  aging 
Albert  Thomas  at the Geneva  International  Labor Office,  the younger  Walter 
Citrine,  and  Ernest Bevin,  who  saw  his job  of  "the large scale organization  of 
labor" as akin to that  of the industrial  manager.25 
The  Left never again  challenged  the premise that  production  was a question 
for managers  and engineers  with  the same  vigor that  they  had  immediately  af- 
ter the first war. Even when  the close of World War II seemed  to offer renewed 
opportunity,  plans  to  reorganize  the  factory  and  control  production  remained 
relatively  undeveloped.  In France,  workers revolted  against  the  coerciveness  of 
the Occupation  and sought  to oust patrons they identified  as both  collaborators 
and  exploiters.  But  their efforts yielded  only  limited  success, and  the  bitterness 
of  the  later  strikes in  1947 and  1948 testified  to  the  frustration  of  aspirations 
raised at the Liberation.  The  Communists  did support new schemes  for a work- 
ers' voice  in  the  tripartite  management  boards  (representing  management,  la- 
bor, and the state) for the nationalized  industries, urged by Minister of Industry 
Marcel  Paul.  But they had to retreat in the face of MRP  and Socialist  counter- 
measures  to ensure  a more  technical  supervision; nor was  it clear  that  the  PC 
had  really wanted  more  than  its own  industrial  barony.26 Italian  workers were 
perhaps most consistent  in reviving factory representation  through  the consigli  di 
gestione. Communist  spokesmen,  however,  came  to  define  these  councils  as  a 
structure for giving  the workers a stake in production.  They  were not  intended 
to replicate  Gramsci's revolutionary  factory councils.27 And,  in Germany,  while 
co-determination  as sought  in the  mining  and  metal  industries  may  well  have 
represented  a creative  and  innovative  demand,  it still remained  an effort more 
to share in the control  of traditional  managerial  functions  rather than  to over- 
throw  them.  The  left-wing  SPD  spokesman  Viktor Agartz  developed  the  most 
25 "The opposition of leaders of labor to bonafide scientific management has practically disappeared,  and 
during recent years there has been noteworthy cooperation between scientific management leaders and labor 
leaders";  H. S. Person,  "Scientific  Management," Industrial  Relations Committee Report, February 15, 1928, 
AFL Papers, Florence Thorne Collection, 117/8A, box  18, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, 
Wisc. Also see Milton J. Nadworny, Scientific  Management  and  the Unions,  1900-1932 (Cambridge,  Mass., 1955); 
Philips, Le Probleme  ouvrier  aux  ttats-Unis, 556; Martin Fine, "Albert  Thomas: A Reformer's  Vision of Modern- 
ization, 1914-1932,"Joumal  of Contemporary  History,  12 (1977):  545-64; Madeline Reberioux  and Patrick  Friden- 
son, "Albert  Thomas, pivot du reformisme  francais,"  Le Mouvement  Social,  87 (1974):  85-97; and Alan Bullock, 
The  Life  and Times  of Ernest  Bevin,  volume 1: Trade  Union  Leader,  1881-1940 (London, 1960), 396. 
26 See Etienne Dejonghe, "Les houilleres a l'epreuve, 1944-1947," Colloque  de Lille, in Revue  du Nord,  57 
(1975): 643-66. On nationalization schemes, see Mario Einaudi et al., Nationalization  in France  and  Italy (Ithaca, 
N.Y., 1955), 96- 105. 
27 For Emilio Sereni's  exhortation,  see Guizzi, "La Fabbrica  italiana Magneti Marelli," 252; and, on the role 
of post-1945  councils, see Paride Rugafiori, "La 'Ricostruzione'  in una grande azienda IRI in crisi:  L'Ansaldo 
(1945-1948)," in Ganapini et al., La Ricostruzione  nella  grande  industria,  428-444; and Giulio Sapelli, "Industriali  e 
lotta di classe a Torino (1945-1947)," ibid.,  445-527. Also see Liliana Lanzardo, Classe  operaia  e partito  comunista 
alla Fiat:  La Strategia  della  collaborazione  (Turin, 1971). For a good survey, see F. Levi et al., II Triangolo  industriale 
tra  ricostruzione  e lotta  di classe,  1945-1948 (Milan, 1974). The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions  for Stability  339 
extensive  concepts  of "economic  democracy"  but  quickly  declined  in  influence 
in his own  party once  the Federal Republic  was constituted.28 In short, the  sec- 
ond postwar era did not resume the fundamental  ideological  challenge  to man- 
agerial  control  of  twenty-five  years  earlier.  The  first postwar  restoration  had 
largely  confirmed  the  premise  that  the  modern  industrial  order  must  operate 
under  hierarchical  chains  of command,  like an army or bureaucracy.  The  pre- 
sumption  of  technical  rationality  legitimized  the  economic  power  that  own- 
ership alone  could  not. 
SUBDUING  LABOR'S  BID  to control  the organization  of production  and,  by  exten- 
sion, to make economic  authority  democratic  was not sufficient, however, to sta- 
bilize a political  economy  that faced great inherent strains after the First World 
War. If the defenders of interwar capitalism  proposed  a social bargain-the  in- 
creasing  satisfaction  of  material  wants  in  return for a restoration  of  industrial 
authority-they  had  to  be  able  to  pay  up.  In  the  interwar  period,  however, 
many  difficulties  precluded  paying  up  for more than  a brief period. 
Two  interlocking  flaws  especially  undermined  sustained  prosperity:  con- 
straints imposed  by the international  economy  and by domestic  conflicts.  Once 
currencies  were  stabilized  under  the  gold-exchange  standard,  balance-of-pay- 
ment  concerns, especially  in light of the postwar creditor position  of the United 
States,  seemed  to  mandate  relatively  low  European  wages  so that  Britain  and 
the  Continent  could  maintain  exports,  compete  internationally,  and  preserve 
their exchange  rates. Reparation  obligations  for Germany  and war debts for the 
Allies just  made  these  constraints  more  demanding.  At  the  same  time,  within 
each country,  economic  leaders remained  preoccupied  with potential  saturation 
of  the  market  and  limits  of  profitability-what  the  Germans  term  Rentabilitat. 
Industry spokesmen felt that profits were faltering, capital  accumulation  and  in- 
vestment  was imperiled,  and, in turn, international  competitiveness  endangered. 
They  sharply attacked what  they perceived as the politically  determined  costs of 
labor and  of new  social-insurance  obligations.29 
But,  while  European  businessmen  fretted  about  impediments  to  accumula- 
tion, the relatively high rates of investment  in the late  1920s may have outpaced 
the purchasing  power that would  sustain the return to capital.  Although  wages 
may not have lagged proportionally  behind  returns to capital,30 urban and rural 
disposable  incomes  did  not  necessarily  grow  sufficiently  to justify  the  contin- 
ued "rationalization"  of the  1920s. In formal terms, what had to be attained  was 
a "warranted growth" path  of capital  and  incomes  that  allowed  the  expansion 
of each to call forth and absorb the increments  of the others. Only  satisfying  the 
28 Ernst Ulrich Huster, Die Politik  der  SPD, 1945-1950 (Frankfurt  a/M,  1978), 35-41. Also see Erich Pott- 
hoff, Der  Kampf  um  die Montanmitbestimmung  (Cologne, 1957);  and Eberhard  Schmidt, Die verhinderte  Neuordnung, 
1945-1950 (Frankfurt  a/M,  1970), 182-200. 
29 For the best recent discussion of these attitudes in Germany, see Bernd Weisbrod, Schwerindustrie  in der 
Weimarer  Republik  (Wuppertal, 1978). 
30  Peter Temin has insisted on this, for the U.S.-European indices can be read in different ways; Temin, 
Did Monetary  Forces  Cause  the  Great  Depression?  (New York, 1976), 32. 340  AHR Forum 
two  constraints  together  allowed  each  to be resolved in its own  right. Only  se- 
curing the two simultaneously,  moreover, was likely to reconcile the major orga- 
nized  interest groups of the  European  economies. 
Reading  backward,  one  can  say,  of  course,  that  the  1930s did  not  find  the 
warranted  growth  path;  and  the  original  statements  of  the  difficulty  reflected 
the  somber  outcome  in their pessimistic  depiction  of a "knife edge"  that  a  dy- 
namic  economy  had to tread if it was not to falter. Later theory, perhaps reflect- 
ing  the  generation  of post-1950  growth,  has suggested  that  in fact  equilibrium 
growth  is relatively  easy to generate: technological  substitutions,  public  spend- 
ing, population  growth, and income  redistribution  have all been shown to make 
ascent  of the  knife edge  far less chancy.3" Indeed,  the  dilemma  of equilibrium 
growth  at  the  end  of  the  1920s was  in  part  self-imposed  by  the  reigning  pre- 
occupation  with capital  shortages and by the brakes placed  on national  income 
growth  by the neomercantilist  policies of the years following  currency stabiliza- 
tion. There  were dissenters to prevailing  policy,  such as John  Maynard  Keynes. 
But  Keynes  remained  a gadfly  and  not  always  consistent  in  his recommenda- 
tions. By the  1930s Keynes and like-minded  adherents of purchasing-power  doc- 
trines pointed  to  the  state  as the  agency  that  could  assure high  aggregate  de- 
mand.  Their  intellectual  task  became  simplified  when  they  urged  that  their 
societies more or less disconnect  from the international  market and  seek higher 
employment  levels autarkically-that  is, that  they cease to fret about  exchange 
rates. Indeed,  abandonment  of old currency parities followed  almost by force ma- 
jeur after  1931. In  the  long  run,  Keynes  also  felt, capital  accumulation  should 
become  a less preoccupying  task, for capital  would  become  more plentiful  in re- 
lation  to the need  for it.32 
Today  these simplifying  premises appear  more problematic.  Indeed,  contem- 
porary Western economic  dilemmas  suggest partial parallels with the difficulties 
perceived  at the end of the  1920s. United  States economic  concepts  for the post- 
war  international  economy  largely  precluded  the  welfare-state  self-sufficiency 
that Keynes  suggested.  This  meant  further that his vision of satiated  investment 
needs, with  its resultant  "euthanasia  of the rentier," was likewise premature.  In- 
dustrial  societies  in  a world  market  arena  can  hardly  allow  investment  to  at- 
rophy without  losing real income  to new competitors.  Even to apply  Keynesian 
macroeconomic  stimulus  to  assure  full  employment  may  bring  deteriorating 
balances  of trade and, if no foreign subsidies are found, declining  welfare.  Some 
31 For the "knife-edge  view" of the warranted  growth path, see R. F. Harrod, "An Essay in Dynamic The- 
ory," EconomicJournal,  49 (1939): 12-33, 377. Also see Evsey D. Domar, "Capital Expansion, Rate of Growth, 
and Employment," Econometrica,  14 (1946): 137-47. James Tobin and Robert M. Solow allowed for various 
tenable rates  of growth with factor substitutability;  see Tobin, "A Dynamic Aggregative  Model,"Journal  of Po- 
litical Economy,  63 (1955): 103-15; and Solow, "A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth," Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 70 (1956): 65-94. For a recent optimistic summary that sees supply normally generating 
demand (with the  1930s as an exceptional catastrophe), see John Cornwall, Growth and Stability in a  Mature 
Economy (London, 1972). 
32 For Keynes's views concerning the decreasing  scarcity of capital, see his The General Theory  of Employment, 
Interest,  and Money (London, 1960), 375-77; and, concerning the advantages of going it alone, see his Essays in 
Persuasion (1931; 2d ed., New York, 1963), 271-96, and "National Self-Sufficiency,"  New Statesman  and Nation, 
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of the  constraints  that  vexed  the  1920s have  thus  re-emerged  and,  with  them, 
the  distributive  conflicts  between  the  interests of wage  earners and  the  spokes- 
men  for capital.  The  difference is that, in the  1920s, the difficulties  were rooted 
in too limited  a confidence  in mass consumption  as a force for growth,  whereas 
in the  1970s they  may  have  derived  from too excessive a reliance. 
What  remains  historically  remarkable  is  that  from  the  late  1940s into  the 
1970s the constraints  of the  interwar  period  eased  as a twin  reorientation  took 
place. First, the United  States developed  a commitment  to European  prosperity; 
second,  the  political  and  economic  calculations  of  Europeans  themselves 
changed  so that they felt less locked into a distributive  contest.  Both changes  to- 
gether eased the iron framework of wages, profits, state claims, and international 
payments.33 
How  could  this reorientation  take place so easily after  1945? For one thing,  it 
was  silently  underway  before  that  date.  The  Depression  had  certainly  dis- 
credited  the old orthodoxies.  The  war also demonstrated  to British and  Ameri- 
can financial  planners that states could  impose  levels of expenditure  far beyond 
what  the budget-balancers  of the  1920s or British Treasury officials of the  1930s 
had imagined  was safe and feasible.34  Certainly  the role of the United  States was 
transformed: the credits of the  1920s had  been  extended  via private  banks  and 
had  remained  hostage  to  the  differential  rates of  return  in  Europe  and  New 
York; the  grants of the  late  1940s represented political  decisions  on  the part  of 
Washington.  The  new  American  policy  did  not come  instantaneously  or auto- 
matically.  Just  as between  1922 and  1924 the  New  York banking  community 
accepted  the need to intervene  in Europe, so, as the newly opened  records of the 
U.S.  National  Advisory Council  on International  Monetary  and Financial  Poli- 
cies  help  show,  Washington  became  increasingly  willing  to  exploit  foreign  aid 
for political  purposes: from the coy hesitation  about extending  loans to the Leon 
Blum  mission  in early  1946, to the  vigorous  European  Recovery  Program  and 
the almost  importuning  support for noncommunist  unions  and parties by  1948, 
to the  funds rushed  to Yugoslavia  after Tito's  break with  the Cominform.35 
The  Marshall  Plan  signaled  a  political  decision  that  the  resources  of  the 
United  States would  be available  for the reconstruction  of a welfare  capitalism 
in Europe. But in quantitative  economic  terms American  aid amounted  to little. 
3  The conflict between international  competitiveness  and demand stimulus at home has been brought out 
especially by the "Scandinavian"  models of two-sector  open economies. See Odd Aukrust, "Inflation in the 
Open Economy:  A Norwegian Model," in Walter S. Salant and Lawrence  B. Krause,  eds., Worldwide  Inflation: 
Theory  and Recent  Experience  (Washington, 1977), 107-53; and Jeffrey Sachs, "Wages, Profits, and Macroeco- 
nomic Adjustment:  A Comparative Study," Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2 (1979): 269-319. 
" On the fiscal conservatism  of the Treasury,  see R. A. C. Parker,  "Economics,  Rearmament, and Foreign 
Policy: The United Kingdom before 1939-A  Preliminary Study,"  Joumal  of Contemporary  History,  10 (1975): 
637-47; Robert Paul Shay, Jr., British  Rearmament  in the Thirties:  Profits  and Politics  (Princeton, 1977), 73-79, 
136-55, 242-46; and Susan Howson, Domestic  Monetary  Management  in Britain,  1919-38 (Cambridge, 1975), 120- 
26. For the transformation  of attitudes, see Donald Winch, Economics  and  Policy:  A Historical  Survey  (London, 
1972), chap. 12; and Herbert Stein, The  Fiscal  Revolution  in America  (Chicago, 1969), chap. 8. 
3  Minutes of the Meetings of the National Advisory  Council on International  Monetary and Financial Pol- 
icies, meetings 23, 24 (May 6, 1946), 89 (March 18, 1948), 112 (December 3, 1948, on Japan), 115-16 (Janu- 
ary 7, 13, 1949), etc., Office of the Secretary  of the Treasury, NA-RG 56. 342  AHR Forum 
For the  major  European  economies  from  1948 through  1951 it  probably  con- 
tributed no more than  10 to 20 percent of capital  formation  during the first two 
emergency  years,  then  tapered  off  to  below  10 percent.36 Washington's  assist- 
ance  served  more  as  capital-liberating  than  as  capital-transfusing.  "The 
basic elements  in Western  Europe's economic  crisis . ..  ," the staff of the Eaton- 
Herter Select Committee  on Foreign Aid accurately  emphasized,  "converge and 
appear in their most conspicuous  aspect as a deficit in the balance  of payments 
with  the  dollar area."37 By easing  balance-of-payments  constraints  and  freeing 
key bottlenecks  for specific  goods,  American  aid  allowed  the  European  econo- 
mies  to  generate  their own  capital  more  freely, certainly  without  returning  to 
the  deflationary  competition  of  the  1930s. U.S.  aid  served,  in  a sense,  like the 
lubricant  in  an  engine-not  the  fuel-allowing  a  machine  to  run  that  would 
otherwise  buckle  and  bind. 
This calculation  suggests that a modulated judgment  on the role of American 
capital  would  be appropriate.  Ultimately,  the  real sources of Europe's  postwar 
" The following table provides the ratio of grants and loans made by the the United States to the gross 
domestic capital formation of the respective  countries.  Gross  domestic capital formation (converted  here into 
dollars at current exchange rates) is a more relevant measure for the postwar years than net investment, for 
the replacement  of depreciated plants meant qualitative improvement. (For Italy in 1948 and 1949, only net 
figures  are available.) Grants  extended during 1948  comprised  largely "interim  aid" as a stop-gap before Mar- 
shall Plan funds strictly speaking came on stream. After 1951, Marshall Plan aid was phased into Mutual 
Security assistance  with major military components. 
Country  1948  1949  1950  1951 
UNITED KINGDOM 
U.S.  Aid  $  937m  $1,009m  $  629m  $  129m  =  9%  = 11%  = 10%  = 2% 
GDCF in $  $10,400m  $9,000m  $6,400m  $6,300m 
FRANCE 
U.S.  Aid  $  781m  $  766m  $  465m  $  421m  - 14%  -=  12%  = 10%  = 7%  GDCF in $  $  5,600m  $6,400m  $4,460m  $5,380m 
WEST GERMANY 
U.S.  Aid  $  1,130m  $  948m  $  470m  $  362m  - 31%  -=  22%  = 11%  -=7%  GDCF in $  $  3,600m  $4,340m  $4,400m  $5,300m 
(est.) 
ITALY 
U.S.  Aid  $  399m  $  437m  $  257m  $  261m  = 27%  = 34%  =10%  = 9%  GDCF in $  $  1,500m  $1,300m  $2,700m  $3,000m 
(net)  (net) 
NOTE:  All figures in millions of current (1948-51) dollars;  only net figures  are available for Italy in 1948 and 
1949, and only an estimate can be made for West Germany in 1948, since the available statistics  do not give 
figures for the first half of that year. 
SOURCES:  Totals of American aid have been taken from Statistical  Abstract  of the United  States,  1954, 898-902; 
British  GDCF, from Statistical  Abstractfor  the United  Kingdom,  no. 87 (1938-49): Table 294, no. 88 (1950): Table 
296, and no. 89 (1952):  Table 288; and, other 1948-49 statistics,  from StatistischesJahrbuchfir  die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland,  1952, 454-55; Annuaire  Statistique  de la France,  59 (1952):  335; and Annuario  Statistico  Italiano,  ser. V, 3 
(1951): 590. Non-British  GDCF estimates for 1950 and 1951 are taken from United Nations, Yearbook  of Na- 
tional  Accounts  Statistics  (1957). 
" U.S. Congress,  House Select Committee on Foreign Aid, Final Report  on  Foreign Aid (May 1, 1948), 80th 
Cong., 2d sess., House Report no. 1845, p. 24. The Two Postwar  Eras and the Conditions  for Stability  343 
growth had to derive from the Continent's  own energies. Indeed,  some  recovery 
was apparently  already underway  by late  1946, even for the battered  West Ger- 
man economy.38 Had  not the fearsome winter of  1946-47  paralyzed  transporta- 
tion,  impeded  food  and  fuel deliveries,  and  radicalized  workers into  politically 
explosive  wage  demands,  recovery might  have  continued.  In that case, without 
the  emergency  American  response  the  ongoing  European  economic  perform- 
ance might  well have resembled, say, British growth in the late  1930s: more pro- 
tectionist  and  less spectacular  than  was  to  be  racked up  under  American  aus- 
pices in the  1950s, but  still respectable. 
In this regard, the American  economic  role in restabilization  after World War 
II paralleled  the political  role. Europe would  probably not have "gone Commu- 
nist" or collectivist  even  if the United  States had  not intervened  with  the same 
resolution.  The  European  middle  classes remained  socially  anchored;  the  Ger- 
man  occupation  had hardly struck or aimed  at them  as a group, nor had  it at- 
tacked their economic  values. But both the political  and economic  development 
of the  1950s would  doubtless  have been less resolutely capitalist  and market-ori- 
ented,  less justified  by  dynamic  success.  Throughout  the  first  three  postwar 
years, in fact, there was less decisive purpose than confused experimentation  and 
uncertain  initiatives.  Business recovery was not held back by ideological  sympa- 
thies for socialism  but by the fear of risky venture, the hesitation  finally to write 
off the  losses of  the  war  years.  Between  1945 and  late  1947, for example,  the 
French and the Italians,  then  the West Germans along  with  their American  oc- 
cupiers, avoided  imposing  the deflationary  reforms that  helped  invigorate  capi- 
talist  growth.39 Nor  were  they  prepared  to  abandon  the  fuzzy  political  com- 
promises, which  found expression in the tripartite Catholic-Socialist-Communist 
governing  coalitions  but  seemed  less and  less likely to mandate  either socialism 
or renewed  capitalist  growth.  Only  in  1947-48,  when  ideological  and  economic 
threats appeared  potentially  catastrophic,  did the spokesmen  for West  Europe's 
middle  classes and  elites, and  their American  sponsors, resolve upon  the  liberal 
capitalist  mandate  that  might  best  be  described  as  a  new  "wager  upon  the 
strong." 
Economic  analysts  have  proposed  several theories for the remarkable  growth 
that  followed.  Structural explanations  include  the sharp increase in agricultural 
productivity  achieved  by tractors and fertilizers, the resultant supply of labor re- 
leased  for industry  (a supply  already  augmented  by the migrants  from  eastern 
Germany  and  the Italian  South,  among  other areas), and  the special  efficiency 
38 Werner Abelshauser, Wirtschafl  in Westdeutschland,  1945-1948 (Stuttgart, 1975), 167-70. 
:  For the French rejection  of deflation, see Richard Kuisel, Modemization  and  the  Managed  Economy:  The  State 
and  Capitalism  in France,  1900-1950 (Cambridge  University Press,  forthcoming),  chap. 7. For the Italians, who 
in 1947 embarked  upon deflation, see George H. Hildebrand, Growth  and  Structure  in the  Economy  of Modern  Italy 
(Cambridge,  Mass., 1965), chaps. 2, 8; Marcello De Cecco, "Sulla politica di stabilizzazione  del 1948,"  in his 
Saggi  di  politica  monetaria  (Milan, 1968), 109-4 1;  and Camillo Daneo, La  politica  economica  della  ricostruzione,  1943- 
1949 (Turin, 1975), chap. 7. On the American and German hesitation to impose early currency reform, see 
Edward  A. Tennenbaum, "The German Mark,"  book draft, chaps. 11-12, Tennenbaum Papers,  box 3, folder 
5, Truman Library, Independence, Mo. Belgium was the outstanding exception to the general inflationary 
languor at the end of the war. For the reforms  of Camille Gutt, see Leon H. Dupriez, Monetary  Reconstruction  in 
Belgium  (New York, 1947). 344  AHR Forum 
of  investment  in  the  context  of  postwar  damage  and  renewal.  Monetarist  ac- 
counts  attribute  success  to  rigorous  stabilization  programs  in  Germany,  Italy, 
and Japan.  The  historian can point  to the wage  restraint that  Dutch,  German, 
and Italian workers demonstrated  because of labor's commitment  to reconstruc- 
tion and, perhaps, to mere exhaustion  after fascist repression and war.'  On  the 
managerial  side,  new  business  confidence  and  technocratic  impulses  gradually 
prevailed.  The  example  of  Pont-a-Mousson  suggests  that  once  public  policy- 
makers, such  as Jean  Monnet  or Robert  Schuman,  made  commitments  to  su- 
pranational  institutions,  a new  generation  of expansionist  entrepreneurs  could 
find support  for pressing vigorous investment  plans within  their own  firms.4" 
The  upshot  was  that  both  the  major  restraints that  had  corseted  the  econ- 
omy  of the  1920s could  be loosened  together.  U.S.  aid helped  overcome  the de- 
flationary pressures resulting from defense of the balance  of payments.  But these 
pressures also remained  minimal  because  a new  generation  of Keynesian-influ- 
enced  administrators  were willing  to take international  deficits in stride. Estab- 
lishment  of European-wide  clearance schemes and the willingness  of intra-Euro- 
pean creditor countries, such as Belgium  and even Italy, to hold sterling or other 
European  currencies as a quid  pro quo for American  aid also eased the strains on 
the economies  tending  toward balance-of-payments  deficits. Washington  policy- 
makers certainly  did  not  like the  impediments  to  currency  convertibility  that 
Europeans  kept  in  force, and  they  continued  to  press for the  removal  of  these 
obstacles  to the free circulation  of dollars. U.S.  Treasury officials and  American 
delegates  to  the  International  Monetary  Fund  insisted  stubbornly  on  convert- 
ibility  even  at  the  cost of  deflationary  policies.  In  contrast,  American  officials 
with  the Marshall  Plan administration  (the ECA) tended  to accept  compromise 
arrangements  that permitted  Europeans  to prolong shielding  their international 
accounts; and even the stern Treasury disciplinarians  had to accept  British can- 
cellation  of sterling  convertibility  after the  disastrous attempt  during  the  sum- 
mer of  1947. They  likewise were compelled  to acquiesce  in French creation  of a 
two-tiered  currency  market in  1948, which  allowed  scope  for floating  exchange 
rates,  and  they  accepted  restrictions  upon  full  convertibility  in  the  European 
clearance  unions  from  1949 through  1951. Preaching  that  all currencies should 
be fully tradable  for dollars, Washington  officials nonetheless  lived with  a com- 
promise  monetary  regime.42 
'  For examples of structural  approaches,  see Ingvar Svennilson,  Growth  and  Stagnation  in the  European  Economy 
(Geneva, 1954);  U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, Economic  Survey  of Europe  in 1961, part 2: Some  Factors 
in Economic  Growth  in Europe  during  the 1950's (Geneva, 1961);  and Charles Kindleberger,  Europe's  Postwar  Eco- 
nomic  Growth:  The  Role  of Labor  Supply  (Cambridge,  Mass., 1967). For an example of the monetarist approach, 
see Hildebrand, Growth  and  Structure  in the  Economy  of Modern  Italy.  Angus Maddison has emphasized policy fac- 
tors, including a Western  internationalism  attributed to the Cold War;  see his "Economic  Policy and Perform- 
ance in Europe, 1913-1970," in Carlo Cipolla, ed., The  Fontana  Economic  History  of Europe,  5 (Glasgow, 1976): 
442-508. For a general treatment,  see M. M. Postan, An  Economic  History  of Western  Europe,  1945-1964 (London, 
1967). 
41  See, for example, the debate on expansion of coking facilities and Roger Martin's advocacy of invest- 
ment, October 16, 1951, PAM, box 70671. Also see Richard Kuisel, "Technocrats  and Public Policy: From 
the Third to the Fourth Republic,"  Journal  of European  Economic  History,  2 (1973): 53-99. 
42  For debates on convertibility,  see Minutes of the Meetings of the National Advisory  Committee on Inter- The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions  for Stability  345 
The  second  major inhibition  that  had  undermined  continuing  expansion  in 
the  1920s  also  disappeared:  the  precarious  "knife  edge"  equilibrium  growth 
path  for  wages  and  investment  broadened  into  an  easy  highway.  If  policy- 
makers no  longer  wished  to  sacrifice living  standards  on  the  altar of fixed  ex- 
change  rates, labor showed  sufficient wage  restraint such that investment  could 
soar. Rather  than relatively high  labor costs impelling  capital  substitution,  rela- 
tively low labor costs permitted  capital  expansion.  The  statistics of the  1950s re- 
veal  not  only  the  familiar  growth  of national  income  but  unprecedented  rates 
of capital  formation  as well:  30  percent  in Japan,  27 percent  in  Germany,  20 
percent  in France and  Italy,  16 percent  in the United  Kingdom,  18 percent  in 
the  United  States.43 In contrast,  the  wages  share of national  income  remained 
stable  or even  dropped  slightly,  as in Western  Germany:  a decade's  halting  of 
the slow but otherwise prevailing  trend of the twentieth  century. The  expansion 
and harmony  that businessmen  had sought  in the  1920s was finally achieved  in 
the  1950s. 
This  result,  of  course,  required  the  cooperation  of  those  labor  leaders  who 
shared the premises of a growth-organized  welfare capitalism-the  commitment 
that I have elsewhere termed the "politics of productivity."44 "The improvement 
of productivity,  in its widest  sense, remains  the  fundamental  problem  of West- 
ern Europe,"  declared  the  Organization  for European  Economic  Cooperation, 
and it echoed  the themes of the managerial  mystique  of the  1920s as it reported, 
"Great emphasis  is placed  in the United  States  ...  upon  public  relations efforts 
by  management  in  acquainting  workers with  their plant,  its problems,  and  its 
place  in  the  economy."45 For  society  as  a  whole,  the  politics  of  productivity 
meant  simply the adjournment  of conflicts over the percentage  share of national 
income  for the rewards of future economic  growth. As one West German official 
explained  to  business  and  labor  representatives  in  the  remarkable  Kbnigstein 
discussions of February  1949 (which,  in effect, adumbrated  West  German  eco- 
nomic  strategies up to the present day),  anyone  who  could  renounce  some  con- 
sumption  had  to renounce  it. "He  had  to save, whether  or not  he wanted,  be- 
cause  he cannot  be  permitted  to evade  the  common  tasks of  reconstruction."46 
national Monetary and Financial Policies, meetings 70, 79-81, 83-84,  134, 153, 158, 171, Office of the Secre- 
tary of the Treasury, NA-RG 56. For the EPU, see William Diebold, Jr., Trade  and  Payments  in Westem  Europe 
(New York, 1972),  64-69; and Albert 0.  Hirschman, "The European Payments Union: The Negotiations and 
the  Issues," Review of Economics  and Statistics, 33  (1951):  49-59. 
43  Simon  Kuznets,  Modem Economic  Growth:  Rate, Structure,  and Spread (New  Haven,  1966),  236-37;  and  U.N. 
Economic  Commission  for Europe,  Some Factors in Economic  Growth in Europe  during the 1950's, chap.  2, pp.  16- 
22. For the wage share of national income, see U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, Incomes  in Postwar  Eu- 
rope:  A Study of Policies, Growth, and Distribution (Geneva,  1967),  chap.  2, pp.  30-31. 
"  See my "The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International Economic Policy after 
World  War  II," in Peter Katzenstein,  ed.,  Between Power and Plenty: The Foreign  Economic  Policies of Advanced  Indus- 
trial  States  (Madison, Wisc., 1978), 23-49; the articles in this volume were first published in 1977, as the au- 
tumn  issue of International  Organization. 
45 Organization for European Economic Co-Operation [hereafter,  OEEC], Europe: The Way Ahead: Towards 
Economic  Expansion  and Dollar Balance,  4th Annual Report of the OEEC (Paris, 1952), 195. Also see Roger 
Gregoire,  "European  Productivity Agency," in OEEC, At Work  for Europe  (5th ed., Paris, 1960), 139-52. 
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As an explicit  principle  of consensus,  economic  growth-the  notion  of continu- 
ously  higher  levels  of  national  product-came  into  its own  at  the  end  of  the 
1940s. The  earliest  public  celebration  of  its virtues  may  well  have  been  Leon 
Keyserling's  speeches  as chairman  of the Council  of Economic  Advisers  during 
1949;47  but  the less precise concepts  of sustained  high  purchasing  power or sim- 
ply  "creconstruction"  or  "production"  served  to  rally labor  as well  as business- 
men  from the end of the war on. 
Throughout  1945  and  1946  Communist  labor  leaders  themselves  seemed 
ready  to accept  the  trade-off between  present consumption  and  future  growth. 
The  increasing hardship of their rank and file during the winter of  1946-47  and 
the  threat of militant  unions  on  their left flank  (aside from any  guidance  that 
Moscow  may  have  urged  as the  dispute  with  the  United  States  deepened)  im- 
pelled  them  to abandon  their collaborative  stance. The  French Communists'  re- 
luctant  sponsorship  of the  Renault  strike, which  likewise  led  to their  dismissal 
from the governing  coalition  (and, similarly, the Belgian Communists'  refusal to 
accept  coal  price increases),  best  revealed  their shifting  priorities.  No  less anti- 
communist  an AFL  representative  than Irving Brown, who  felt that  the  succes- 
sive strikes revealed the Communists'  "complete desire to destroy the government 
even  at the cost of permanently  destroying  France," understood  that  a socialist 
movement  could  hardly  recapture leadership  within  the CGT  if it participated 
in a cabinet  seeking to freeze wages.48 Despite  the admitted  difficulty  in  recon- 
structing  a  mass  base  for  the  socialists,  by  1947-48,  American  policymakers, 
AFL  emissaries,  and  European  businessmen  diligently  encouraged  the  forma- 
tion of social democratic  unions in the Latin countries and pressed for the purge 
of Communist  sympathizers  from British, German,  and  American  federations. 
The  moderates of Force Ouvriere, the TUC,  or the Italian Catholic  union  feder- 
ation  (CISL) became  all the more essential as interlocutors for labor. "The trend 
in  Europe  is clearly  toward  the  Left," noted  one  of the  Department  of  State's 
leading  European  analysts  shortly  after  tripartism  collapsed.  "I  feel  that  we 
should  try to keep  it a non-communist  Left and  should  support  Social-Demo- 
cratic  governments."49 The  axis of  the  politics  of productivity  thus  had  to  fall 
47  Keyserling, "Prospects  for American Economic Growth,"  Address  in San Francisco,  September 18, 1949, 
Truman Library, President's  Secretary's  File 143: "Agencies:  Council of Economic Advisers." 
48  Brown, "Report on Greece, France, and England,"  July 7, 1947, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 
AFL Papers, Florence Thorne Collection, 117/8A, box 17, F. 3A. On the events of 1947, see Wilfried Loth, 
"Frankreichs  Kommunisten und der Beginn des kalten Krieges:  Die Entlassung  der kommunistischen  Minis- 
ter im Mai 1947," Vierte4lahrshefteftir  Zeitgeschichte,  26 (1978):  9-65, and "Die franzdsischen  Sozialisten  und der 
Marshall-Plan,"  in Lutz Niethammer, ed., Die europdischen  Linke  und  der  Marshall-Plan  (forthcoming).  Also see 
Vincent Auriol,  Journal  du Septennat,  ed. Pierre Nora and Jacques Ozouf, volume 1: 1947 (Paris, 1970),  passim; 
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NA-RG 59, 855.00/3-1147 (no. 372), 855.00/3-2147 (no. 1069), 855.00/3-3147 (no. 1097). 
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right in the center of the labor movement:  "politically  speaking  the break must 
come  to left of or at the very least in the middle  of the  [French] Socialist  party. 
Translated  into  labor  terms,  the  healthy  elements  of organized  labor  must  be 
kept in the non-Communist  camp.  Otherwise  the tiny production  margin of the 
fragile French economy  would  vanish and  the ensuing  civil disturbances  would 
take on  the  aspects of civil  war."50 
The  economic  premises that the "healthy elements" of labor subscribed to re- 
mained  precisely those of the trade-union  leaders who had pioneered  collabora- 
tive labor relations in the late  1920s. Union  spokesmen such as Ernest Bevin  had 
then joined  progressive industrialists for talks on enhancing  productivity.  By the 
late  1940s they were serving in high office. Their integration  testified to the post- 
war years' fulfilment  of the second  criterion for stabilizing  the welfare capitalist 
economies  of  the  West.  The  new  cooperation,  along  with  America's  under- 
writing,  ensured  that  capital  accumulation  and  wages  and  welfare  benefits 
could  increase in tandem,  thus overcoming  the  fatal impediments  to sustained 
growth  in  the  1920s. As  Western  leaders  looked  more  and  more  to  economic 
growth,  increasingly  presupposed,  first, as automatic  and,  second,  as the  major 
index of a society's welfare, the stakes of politics narrowed. Communism  increas- 
ingly became  a permanent  and sullen opposition,  to be analyzed,  in the spirit of 
the  1950s, as inherently pathological.  At the same time, the appeal of neofascism 
or Gaullism  remained  fitful, largely  consigned  to  the  regions  that  paid  for dy- 
namic  growth  elsewhere  with  their own  relative  backwardness.  In the  political 
center Christian  Democrats  (or Tories  in Britain)  either shared power with  So- 
cial Democrats  or alternated  officeholding  in a consensual  politics  that  debated 
only  whether  the anticipated  dividends  of economic  growth  should  be devoted 
to social-welfare consumption  or ploughed  back into private investment.  Resid- 
ual  colonial  or religious  and  ethnic  issues-not  the  baselines  of political  econ- 
nomy-remained  the major sources of passion  and  controversy. 
Repression,  cooptation,  and  the  success of the  managerial  mystique  with  its 
vogue  of productivity  had  reconsolidated  the  bureaucratic  organization  of  in- 
dustrial  work in the  1920s. The  economic  accomplishments  of the period  after 
1948 completed  the second  half of the stabilization  assignment.  They  seemed  to 
eliminate  the vulnerability  of economic  life and  enhanced  legitimacy  with  out- 
put  and  growth.  Despite  the tragic waste of the Great Depression,  the  immense 
destructiveness  of two world wars, and  the countless  lives scattered  like dry au- 
tumn  leaves throughout  Europe,  Western  leaders recovered more of their pros- 
perity  and  liberalism,  retained  more  of  their  privileges  and  prerogatives,  than 
they  would  have  dared predict. 
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SUCCESSFUL  SYSTEMS OF  POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM  must  remain  isolated  (as  did 
Tokugawa  Japan)  or be  international  in scope.  The  notable  eras of  European 
stabilization-the  generation  after Utrecht,  for example,  or the half-century  af- 
ter  Vienna-have  been  periods  of  class  equilibrium  and  international  com- 
promise  simultaneously.  The  configurations  of power among  states tend  to sec- 
ond  those  within  societies.  The  Vienna  settlement  consisted  of  adjustments 
between  states  but  also comprised  a restoration  of old  and  new  landed  classes 
along with  a strengthened  bureaucracy.  Pax Britannica  assimilated  bourgeois ele- 
ments  to  this  international  coalition  and  added  resources  outside  Europe  to 
equilibrate  strains at home.  Fully to comprehend  the period  from  1918 to  1950 
as a search  for stabilization  on  the  part of old  upper  and  middle  classes,  now 
augmented  by a reformist working-class leadership, requires looking at the inter- 
national  architecture  as well  as domestic  structures. Obviously,  the  Cold  War 
had  a decided  influence  on internal outcomes  after World War II. But to regis- 
ter this connection  hardly  reveals the  principles  of interaction.  The  Cold  War 
did  not,  in  itself, determine  the  logic  of  the  international  system  for domestic 
stability. 
The  surprising centers of growth in the  1950s and  1960s were West Germany, 
Japan,  and, though  a smaller economy,  Italy. West Germany  and Japan,  above 
all, became  virtual engines of capital  accumulation.  As such, they played  a criti- 
cal  role in  U.S.  encouragement  of  an  international  coalition  of  liberal  polities 
with  mixed  capitalist  economies.  Although,  as of  1944, the  U.S.  Treasury  re- 
soundingly  rejected the idea that a German economic  contribution  would  be vi- 
tal for European  prosperity, Congressmen,  the Harriman  mission  (to prepare for 
Marshall  Plan  aid),  and  industrial  leaders by  1947 viewed  German  recovery  as 
doubly  critical, both  for its own  sake and  for the economic  linchpinning  of  the 
wider region.5"  If integrated  into a West European  system of exchange,  German 
skilled labor, technological  virtuousity,  and coal would  benefit all her neighbors. 
Without  German recovery and integration,  their economies  must operate less ef- 
ficiently.  The  same  calculation  came  to hold  for Japan  and  its role in America 
after the Communist  takeover in China  and hostilities in Korea.52 Opponents  of 
a punitive  treatment  for Germany  had emphasized  their European economic  vi- 
sion from the outset,  and by the summer  of  1947 their concept  had quickly  be- 
come  the  main  theme  of the  influential  spokesmen  for German  recovery.  The 
lesson was not  lost on  industrial  interests in the emerging  state: when  German 
firms petitioned  to raise their output  or rebuild their rolling mills, their directors 
51 U.S. Treasury Memorandum, "Is European Prosperity  Dependent upon German Industry?"  September 
7, 1944, Mudd Library,  Princeton University, Harry Dexter White Papers,  box 7, F. 22e: "In short, the state- 
ment that a healthy European economy is dependent upon German industry was never true, nor will it be 
true in the future."  For the turnabout, see "Records  of Conferences,"  Harriman mission,  summer 1947, W. A. 
Harriman's  papers,  Washington, D.C. Also see John Gimbel, The  Origins  of the  Marshall  Plan (Stanford, 1976), 
and The  American  Occupation  of Gemany,  1945-1949 (Stanford, 1968), 147-58, 163-69, 174-85. 
52  Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, The  Limits  of Power:  The World  and United  States  Foreign  Policy,  1945-1954 
(New York, 1972),  chaps. 11, 19;  Jon Halliday, A Political  History  ofJapanese  Capitalism  (New York, 1975), 182- 
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unabashedly  pleaded  the cause of good  Europeans.53 Nor was recovery only  the 
demand  of businessmen.  German  trade unions  and  the AFL,  which  supported 
them,  strongly advocated  industrial  reconstruction.54 Rehabilitation  of the Ger- 
man economy  thus emerged  as critical for the United  States's wager on produc- 
tivity. 
Was it just an accident  that the countries that forged ahead so brilliantly  and 
then  came  to  serve  as international  poles  of  growth  even  beyond  expectation 
were  the  exfascist  powers? This  question  must  be confronted,  despite  its harsh 
implications.  Did  Washington,  in  effect,  reap  the  final  benefit  from  the  dis- 
cipline  and  coercion  of labor that  the Axis states had  earlier imposed?  Not  di- 
rectly, of course. But the American-sponsored  international  economy  may  have 
ultimately  benefited  from the  fact that  the working  classes within  the  defeated 
countries  had  been  atomized  by political  repression, wartime  sacrifices, and  the 
mere tasks of survival. Labor leaders who returned from concealment,  prison, or 
exile  faced  sufficient  challenge  just  in  rebuilding  their  shattered  movements. 
Stressing the necessity of production  appeared  to them less a contribution  to res- 
toration  than  the premise  for the patient  work of reorganization.55 In addition, 
defeat  and  occupation  clearly  permitted  the  United  States  more  direct  inter- 
vention  than  was possible  elsewhere.  Occupation  authorities  in all  three  coun- 
tries could  limit  the  organization  of political  unions,  postpone  nationalization, 
and  halt strikes. Allied  fiscal control-exerted  perhaps  most consistently  by Jo- 
seph Dodge  in Japan56-ultimately  reinforced those who  advocated  rapid capi- 
tal  formation,  although  businessmen  often  resisted at first. Harder  to measure, 
but just as important,  was the yearning  for private goals in countries where  fas- 
cists  had  sought  to  politicize  all  aspirations  and  relationships.  The  United 
States, after all, was gambling  on the renewed persuasiveness of individual  well- 
being. 
Germany,  however,  had hitherto  repeatedly  resisted integration  into an inter- 
national  productive  coalition.  Insofar as the international  divisions of the period 
from  1914 to  1950 had  an economic  dimension,  they  involved  conflict  less be- 
tween  capitalist  societies and a Bolshevik challenger  than among  different capi- 
talist  alternatives.  Anglo-American  disagreements  over  the  organization  of  a 
global  economy  persisted and  raised bitter recriminations  on each  side. The  is- 
sue remained  whether  the international  economy  should  maximize  multilateral 
53 See, for example, Akten des Verwaltungsamtes  fur Eisen und Stahl, BA Koblenz, Z 41/23: "Vorschlag  zur 
Wiedereinschaltung  der August Thyssen Hutte in der europaischen  Stahlplanung ...  9 Februar 1950." 
54 For example, see the works council of Robert Bosch, AG's protest against decartelization proceedings, 
March  17,  1948, Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund  Archiv, Dusseldorf: "Wirtschaftspolitik,  Dekartellierung 
1948-49." For similar objections to controls on German industry, see BA Koblenz, B  109/345: "Stellung- 
nahme der Gewerkschaften  zum Ruhrstatut vom 7. Januar 1949." For a specimen of AFL support, see Wil- 
liam Green to President  Truman, November 24, 1947,  AFL Papers,  William Green Collection, 11  7A/1 IC, box 
7F (Marshall Plan). 
5'  For an example of this organizational  effort, see [Hans Bbckler]  "Bericht  der Deutschlandreise,  6. Marz 
bis 30. April 1946," Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund  Archiv, Dusseldorf. 
56  Detroit Public Library,  Joseph Dodge Papers,  Japan Assignment, box 1, F: "Budget:  Ikeda Interviews," 
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trade  and  welfare,  but  thereby  reward  the  most  massive  and  technologically 
productive  economy,  or whether  as the British desired, it should  be based  upon 
regional  systems  of  dominion  that  guaranteed  international  markets  to  the 
weaker  power.57 Still,  the  British  dominion  alternative  seemed  to  be  a  limited 
challenge,  whereas  the  German  threat  to  the  open  international  economy  had 
been  more  ominous  and, just  as critical,  the  emanation  of an  ugly  political  re- 
gime. 
This  is not  to  argue  that  Nazism  was  menacing  because  of  its  international 
economic  policies-the  autarky  and  bilateralism  that  so angered  Cordell  Hull. 
Instead,  the connection  between  politics  and  economics  was central  to the  very 
way  Nazism  was interpreted  as a regime. American  commentators  viewed  Naz- 
ism as an  abusive  political  economy:  a cartel of monopolists  who  subordinated 
the  public  sphere  to  private  forces.")  Although  Hjalmar  Schacht's  bilateral 
treaties yoked  Eastern  Europe  into  a German-dominated  economic  bloc,  trade 
access to this area was hardly  a crucial  stake in itself. Nevertheless,  a Germany 
that  was  enrolled  in  a system  of  international  exchange  with  the  West,  as the 
Weimar  Republic  had  been  from  1924 to the  Depression,'59  naturally  appeared 
a safer and  more  decent  participant  in a liberal  international  order. 
Hence  the central  conflict  defining  the  international  political  ecoriomy  from 
World  War I until about  1950 was not that between  American  and Soviet  alter- 
natives,  between  capitalism  and communism.  The  Soviet-American  antagonism 
after  World  War  II,  in  effect,  imposed  a  framework  on  international  politics 
but  did  not exhaust  the  issues. Viewed  over the whole  half century,  the  Ameri- 
can  international  economic  effort of  the  era of  stabilization  centered  on  over- 
coming  British,  Japanese,  and  especially  German  alternatives  to  a  pluralist, 
niarket-economy  liberalism.  In the case of Germany,  these alternatives  were  in- 
corporated  first in Berlin's vision of Mitteleuropa  during  Ludendorff's  regime  of 
1917-18  and  then  in Hitler's expansionist  Reich.  Defeating  these German  proj- 
ects,  however,  could  be  only  the  first stage  in erecting  a stable  alternative.  To 
assure liberal,  pluralist  stability  within  each  West  European  country,  as well  as 
for the Atlantic  region  as a whole,  required  the  further step of integrating  Ger- 
man  economic  dynamism  into an international  system of exchange:  perhaps  the 
pre-eminent  Western  diplomatic  task in each  postwar  reconstruction  period. 
These  respective  postwar  tasks, however,  took more than just  German  defeat; 
they  also  required  that  the  United  States  assume  the  burden  of  funding  Ger- 
many's  international  deficits-including  reparations-after  the two wars. Amer- 
7Richard  Gardner,  Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy: Anglo-American Cooperation  in  the Reconstruction  of  Multilateral 
Trade (Oxford,  1956); and  Benjamin  M.  Rowland,  "Preparing  the American  Ascendancy:  The  Transfer  of  Ec- 
onomic  Power  from  Britain  to  the  United  States,"  in  Rowland,  ed.,  Balance of Power or Hegemony:  The Interwar 
Monetary  System (New  York,  1976),  195-224. 
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ican  reluctance  to  take  on  this  responsibility  until  1924  (and  then  only  in- 
directly)  helped  produce  the  impasses  of  the  five  years  after  Versailles.  U.S. 
willingness  to  take on  the  burden  after  1947 facilitated  the  stabilization  of the 
1950s and  1960s. But American  readiness was no automatic  decision. As one mi- 
nor Department  of State  official wrote before victory  in Europe,  "It seems  cer- 
tain that Germany  has lost the war; but  it appears that  Dr. Schacht  has a very 
good  chance  of winning  the peace."' 
In light of these developments,  the international  corollary of the era of domes- 
tic stabilization  may  be viewed  as a German-American  (or perhaps  a trilateral 
German-American-Japanese)  association  achieved  only  after  two  world  wars. 
Success for this policy was registered not by the rubble of Berlin but by the frus- 
tration of such postwar German  leaders as Jakob  Kaiser of the CDU  and  Kurt 
Schumacher  of the  SPD,  both  of whom  sought  unsuccessfully  to maintain  un- 
der  democratic  auspices  a  less capitalist  and  less exclusively  Western-oriented 
German  society.61 Their  very setbacks testified to the triumph  of stabilization  in 
West  Germany,  Western  Europe,  and  the  noncommunist  countries  as  a 
whole.  Just  as the  end  of  the  second  war against  Germany  resolved  the  inter- 
national  issues left undecided  after the close of the first, so the strengthening  of 
Western pluralism after the second war completed  the European  domestic  insti- 
tutional  restructuring  begun  after  the  first. Stabilization  meant  an  end  to  the 
German  problem.  It likewise  meant  winning  the  adherence  of a large  enough 
segment  of the working classes to preserve the scope for private economic  power 
and  hierarchy that  defined  liberal capitalism.  The  achievement  was not simply 
restorative, for the new,  very real guarantees  of social welfare and  social-demo- 
cratic political  participation  contributed  change  even  as they  purchased  conti- 
nuity. 
This  suggests  that  the  major  sociopolitical  assignment  of  the  twentieth  cen- 
tury  paralleled  that  of  the  nineteenth,  which  saw  the  incorporation  of  the 
middle  classes and  European  bourgeoisie  into the political  community.  The  in- 
ternational  corollaries of the earlier development  were the paralysis and  reduc- 
tion of Metternichian  Austria within  Europe and  the extension  of overseas em- 
pire. The  international  corollaries of the  new  development  were the  linking  to 
the West  of at least part of Germany  and  the recession of overseas empire:  the 
trajectory from grandeur  to welfare. The  institutional  device  for the nineteenth 
century  was parliamentary  representation;  the  institutional  foci for the  twenti- 
eth-century  achievement  included  trade  unions,  ambitious  state  economic 
agencies,  and  bureaucratized  pressure groups-the  components  of what  I have 
termed  elsewhere  "corporate pluralism." 
Observers  have  often  failed  to  note  the  magnitude  of  the  twentieth-century 
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Political  Behavior  (Stanford, 1965);  and Ernst Nolte, Deutschland  und  der  Kalte  Krieg  (Munich, 1974), 208-14, 322- 
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accomplishment  because  the  costs  were  so  distressing.  Certainly  this  essay 
should  not  be  read  as an  argument  that,  because  stability  resulted,  the  inter- 
vening  tyranny,  warfare,  sacrifice,  and  resistance  lose  their  historical  signifi- 
cance.  Still, to ask about  significance  is to search for meaning,  which  is just  one 
task of history. To  trace the structural  principles  of collective  life must  remain 
an equally  valid historical enterprise; and that pursuit compels  us to admit  that 
even  catastrophic  events  do  not  always  durably  alter the  trajectory of  institu- 
tions any  more than  the constant  slow renewal  that  procedes  in the absence  of 
disaster. Indeed,  that  continuing  change  best  facilitates  the  analysis  of  earlier 
patterns. If now the institutional  solutions  of the second  postwar era show signs 
of  wear  and  tear,  if  the  social  compromises  of  the  welfare  state  become  pre- 
carious as economic  growth falters, if the stability of the past generation  appears 
perhaps  to  have  rested on  exceptional  and  transitory  advantages,  such  as the 
consensus on postwar reconstruction  or the ease of securing  resources from out- 
side Europe,  then  we can better begin  to understand  the recent era not  merely 
as events  but  as history. 